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Attack-Resilient State Estimation in the Presence of Noise
Miroslav Pajic

Paulo Tabuada

Abstract— We consider the problem of attack-resilient state
estimation in the presence of noise. We focus on the most general
model for sensor attacks where any signal can be injected via
the compromised sensors. An l0 -based state estimator that can
be formulated as a mixed-integer linear program and its convex
relaxation based on the l1 norm are presented. For both l0 and
l1 -based state estimators, we derive rigorous analytic bounds
on the state-estimation errors. We show that the worst-case
error is linear with the size of the noise, meaning that the
attacker cannot exploit noise and modeling errors to introduce
unbounded state-estimation errors. Finally, we show how the
presented attack-resilient state estimators can be used for sound
attack detection and identification, and provide conditions on
the size of attack vectors that will ensure correct identification
of compromised sensors.

I. I NTRODUCTION
In recent years, several incidents have raised attention to
security challenges in existing control systems and illustrated
their susceptibility to attacks. Examples of these incidents
include the Maroochy Water breach [1], the StuxNet virus
attack on an industrial SCADA system [2], and attacks on
modern automotive systems [3]. Some of the documented
control system vulnerabilities were exposed by non-invasive
attacks on system sensors, where an adversarial signal is
injected into the measured data by modifying a sensor’s
physical environment. For instance, several attacks on GPS
based navigation systems (e.g., [4]) and Anti-lock Braking
Systems [5] have been reported, illustrating that the use of
standard authentication based network security techniques
does not guarantee security of control systems.
Consequently, significant efforts have been invested into
development of control techniques that exploit some knowledge of system dynamics for attack detection and attackresilient control (e.g., [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]). One line
of work has focused on attack-detection [12], [13]. Furthermore, state estimation in presence of sensor and actuator
attacks has attracted significant attention due to the fact that
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systems capable of correctly estimating the plant’s state from
corrupted measurements would be able to continue operating
even under attack. For noiseless linear time-invariant (LTI)
systems for which the exact plant model is known, the attackresilient state estimation problem has been formulated as an
l0 optimization problem [8], [9]. In addition, in [14], the
authors present an SMT-based state estimation technique.
However, for systems with noise, it is unclear what kind of
guarantees can be given regarding the performance of attackresilient state estimators. To the best of our knowledge,
the first work on this topic was [15] where we introduced
an l0 -based attack-resilient state estimator for systems with
bounded noise, which can be formulated as a Mixed-Integer
Linear Program (MILP). We also showed its robustness to
noise and modeling errors, and provided a complex designtime procedure to bound the worst-case state estimation error
in the presence of sensor attacks.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of attack-resilient
state estimation for linear dynamical systems with noise. We
consider the most general model for sensor attacks where any
signals can be injected via the compromised sensors [7]. We
start from the l0 -based state estimation procedure introduced
in [9] and show how it can be adapted for systems with
noise. The main limitation of the l0 -based state estimators
is that solving the corresponding optimization problem is
NP-hard in general. Thus, by exploiting properties of the
l1 norm we provide a computationally efficient, convex
optimization based state estimation procedure for systems
with noise. We also derive rigorous analytic bounds on
the state-estimation errors for both l0 and l1 -based state
estimation procedures. We show that the worst-case error
is linear with the size of the noise, and when the number
of attacked sensors is not higher than a predefined number,
which depends on the properties of the system’s observability
matrix, the attacker cannot exploit noise and modeling errors
to introduce unbounded state-estimation errors. Finally, we
present how these attack-resilient state estimators can be
exploited for sound attack detection and identification.
Note that our work exploits some of the ideas initially
introduced in the domain of compressed sensing [16]. In
particular, the problem of extraction of block-sparse signals
have been recently addressed in the community (e.g., [17]),
while [18] provides guarantees for extraction of (non-block)
sparse signals in presence of structured interference.
A. Notation and Terminology
For a set S, |S| denotes the cardinality (i.e., size) of the
set. In addition, for a set K ⊂ S, with K{ we denote the
complement set of K with respect to S – i.e., K{ = S \ K.

We use AT to indicate the transpose of matrix A, while
i element of a vector xk is denoted by xk,i . For vector x
and matrix A, we denote by |x| and |A| the vector and matrix
whose elements are absolute values of the initial vector and
matrix, respectively. For matrices P and Q, by P ≤ Q we
specify that the matrix P is element-wise smaller than the
matrix Q. In addition, for a symmetric matrix Q, Q  0
denotes that the matrix is positive semidefinite.
We use R to denote the set of reals. Also, Ip denotes the
identity matrix of size p, while I(·) denotes the indicator
function. Finally, for a vector e ∈ Rp , the support of the
vector is the set supp(e) = {i | ei 6= 0} ⊆ {1, 2, ..., p},
while l0 norm of vector e is the cardinality of supp(e) –
i.e., kekl0 = |supp(e)|.
th

II. P ROBLEM D ESCRIPTION
We consider LTI systems of the form
xk+1 = Axk
yk = Cxk + wk + ek .

(1)

The plant’s output vector y ∈ Rp contains measurements of
the plant’s state x ∈ Rn provided by p sensors from the
set S = {s1 , s2 , ..., sp }. We assume the measurement noise
vector w ∈ Rp to be bounded; specifically, we assume that
|wk | ≤ δwk , for all k ≥ 0. Finally, the sparse vector e ∈ Rp
with support in set K ⊆ S denotes the attack vector injected
by a malicious attacker using sensors from K.1
The attack-resilient state estimation problem focuses on
reconstruction of the initial system state x0 from a set of
N output observations2 y0 , y1 , . . . , yN −1 corrupted by an
attacker with access to the sensors from the set K – i.e.,
yk = CAk x0 + ek + wk .
Since set K is not known before the estimation, additional
goal is to identify compromised sensors (i.e., identify set K).
1) Model Motivation: The aforementioned attack-resilient
state estimation problem can be also used for the general
form of LTI systems
xk+1 = Axk + Buk + vp k
yk = Cxk + vm k + ek ,

(2)

with A ∈ Rn×n , B ∈ Rn×m , and C ∈ Rp×n , while process
and measurement noise, vp ∈ Rn and vm ∈ Rp respectively,
are bounded in size. Here, to obtain the plant’s state at any
time-step t (i.e., xt ), the goal is to utilize the previous N
sensor measurement vectors (yt−N +1 , ..., yt ) and actuator
inputs (ut−N +1 , ..., ut−1 ) to evaluate the state xt−N +1 .
For noiseless systems, the state can be obtained as the
minimization argument of the following optimization problem [9], [15]
min

Et,N ∈Rp×N , x∈Rn

s. t.

kEt,N kl0
(3)

Et,N = Yt,N − ΦN (x)

1 In this work, we sometimes abuse notation with K denoting both the set
of compromised sensors and the set of indices of the compromised sensors.
2 Note that the measurement history size N is an input parameter to the
state-estimation procedure.

Here, the matrix Et,N = [et−N +1 |et−N +2 | . . . |et ] captures the last N attacks vectors. In addition, Yt,N =
[ỹt−N +1 |ỹt−N +2 | . . . |ỹt ] maintains the last N sensor measurements compensated for the impact of the inputs applied
during that interval – i.e.,
k =t−N +1

ỹk = yk ,
ỹk = yk −

k−t+N
X −2

CAi Buk−1−i , k = t − N + 2, ..., N.

i=0

Finally, theh linear mapping ΦN : Rin → Rp×N defined as
ΦN (x) = Cx|CAx| . . . |CAN −1 x specifies the observed
system evolution, due to its dynamics, from initial state x.
Therefore, for the general form of LTI systems (2), the
state-estimation problem can be mapped into the state estimation for systems from (1), where control inputs are discarded.
In addition, as shown in [15], the bounds on the size of
measurement noise in (2) can be related to the bounds on the
size of process and measurement noise vectors, vp and vm .
III. ATTACK -R ESILIENT S TATE E STIMATORS
We start by introducing the following notation. We use
PK to denote the projection from the set S to set K by
keeping only rows of C with indices that correspond to
T
sensors from K. Formally, PK = [ ik1 ... ik|K| ] , where
K = {sk1 , ..., sk|K| } ⊆ S and k1 < ... < k|K| , and iTj
denotes the row vector (of appropriate size) with a 1 in its
j th position being the only non-zero element of the vector.
Also, for any sensor si we define the matrices Osi and OK




Osi1
P{si } C
 Osi 
 P{si } CA 
2




OK = 
Osi = 

 , (4)
..
..




.
.
N −1
Osi|K|
P{si } CA
We will also slightly abuse the notation by using Oi to denote
Osi for each sensor si .
T
In addition, we use ẽi = [ e0,i e1,i ... eN −1,i ] ∈ RN , for
all i ∈ {1, ..., p}, to denote the values injected via sensor si
(i.e., attack signals on sensor si ) at time-steps 0, ..., N − 1.3
From the definition, if si ∈
/ K then ẽi = 0 ∈ RN . Similarly,
T
for all i ∈ {1, ..., p}, we use ỹi = [ y0,i ... yN −1,i ] and w̃i =
T
w
...
w
N −1,i ]
[ 0,i
to denote all measurements obtained by the
sensor si and measurement noise at the sensor respectively, at
time-steps 0, ..., N −1. Hence, we have that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ p
ỹi = Oi x0 + ẽi + w̃i

(5)

we
vectors
ỹ, ẽ, w̃ ∈ RpN as ỹ =
 Finally,
 define block

T
T
T T
T
T T
ỹ1 ... ỹp , ẽ = ẽ1 ... ẽp , and w̃ = w̃1T ... w̃pT ,

 T
T
and matrix O = O1 ... OTp .4 Since each element of
the measurement noise vectors w0 , ..., wN −1 is bounded
(i.e., |wk,i | ≤ δwk,i , 0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ p), we
denote by Ω ⊂ RpN the feasible set of noise vectors w̃.
that vector ẽi corresponds to the ith row of the matrix E from (3).
matrix O is obtained by reordering rows of the standard observability matrix OS for the system (A, C), rank(O) = rank(OS ).
3 Note

4 Since

In addition, for any set R ⊂ S, we define w̃R to be
the block vector obtained by concatenating w̃si for all
si ∈ R starting from the smallest i to the largest, while
the corresponding ΩR ⊂ R|R|N denotes the feasible set
of vectors w̃R . We similarly define the matrix OR to be
obtained by concatenating matrices Oi for all si ∈ R.
Now, from (5), it follows that
ỹ = Ox0 + ẽ + w̃.

kẽkl2 ,l0 =
kẽkl2 ,l1 =

i=1
p
X

I(kẽi kl2 > 0)
(7)
kẽi kl2

i=1

This allows us to define block q-sparse vector ẽ as a vector
that satisfies kẽkl2 ,l0 = q, meaning that it has q nonzero subvectors. Hence, if the set of compromised sensors K has q
elements (i.e., |K| = q) then vector ẽ is q-block sparse.
Using the above notation, the optimization problem (3)
can be represented as:
P0 :
s. t.

min kẽkl2 ,l0
ẽ,x

(8)

ỹ − Ox0 − ẽ = 0

Now, consider the measurement vector ỹ for a noiseless
system’s (i.e., when Ω = 0 ∈ RpN ) evolution due to the
initial state x0 and attack vector ẽ∗ . If the number of attacked
sensors q = |K| is not higher than a certain number qmax ,5
the minimization arguments of the problem P0 are exactly
the initial state x0 and the attack vector ẽ∗ [9]. Thus, in
this case the estimator P0 also correctly identifies the set of
attacked sensors K. Furthermore, for noiseless systems P0 is
optimal in the sense that if another estimator can recover the
initial state (which would also result in identification of the
attacked sensors), the attack-resilient state estimator based
on P0 can as well [9].
On the other hand, P0 cannot be used when noisy sensor
measurements are available (i.e., when Ω 6= 0 ∈ RpN ).
For instance, in this case the point (x0 , ẽ∗ ) might not even
be feasible. Thus, as we showed in [15], attack-resilient
state estimation can be performed by solving the following
problem that allows for the noise allowance
P0,ω :
s. t.

min kẽkl2 ,l0
ẽ,x

ỹ − Ox0 − ẽ = w̃

min kẽkl2 ,l1

P1,ω :
s. t.

ẽ,x

(9)

w̃ ∈ Ω
The problem P0,ω involves combinatorial optimization and
as we presented in [15] it can be solved using MILP solvers.
However, solving P0,ω is NP-hard in the general case, which
limits its use on smaller size systems. A common approach
used in compressed sensing is to replace l0 norm by l1
5 The number q
max depends on the properties of the observability matrix
of the system. We will cover this in more detail in Section IV.

(10)

ỹ − Ox0 − ẽ = w̃
w̃ ∈ Ω

(6)

For block vectors obtained by concatenating p vectors,
such as ẽ and ỹ, we also use the notation from [17]
p
X

norm, which effectively convexifies the problem and reduces
its computational requirements. Consequently, to perform
the attack-resilient state estimation we also consider the
following optimization problem

However, it is unclear what guarantees can be provided
regarding the performance of the attack-resilient state estimators P0,ω and P1,ω . Specifically, we are interested in
obtaining worst-case bounds on the state estimation errors
caused by noise and attacks on sensors, and answering
the question whether the attacker can exploit the noise to
introduce an unbounded state estimation error. Furthermore,
we will investigate conditions that ensure that the presented
state estimators can be used to correctly identify the set of
attacked sensors.
IV. P ERFORMANCE G UARANTEES FOR P0,ω E STIMATOR
In this section, we focus on the performance degradation
of the P0,ω state estimator due to the existence of noise.
Specifically, we are interested in providing bounds on ∆xl0
that is defined as
(xl0 ,ω , ẽl0 ) = arg min P0,ω , q0,ω = kẽl0 kl2 ,l0
l0

∆x = xl0 ,ω − x0 ,

l0

l0

∗

∆ẽ = ẽ − ẽ

(11)
(12)

We will also denote ith blocks of ∆xl0 , ∆ẽl0 , and ẽl0 as
∆xli0 , ∆ẽli0 , and ẽli0 , respectively.
We consider systems where the number of compromised
sensors q = |K| is not higher than qmax – the maximal
number of attacked sensors for which the system’s state can
be recovered in the noiseless case. Thus, before we proceed
with our analysis, we first characterize conditions under
which it is possible to perform the state estimation even for
noiseless systems. We start with the following definition.
Definition 1 ([19]): An LTI system from (1) is said to be
s-sparse observable if for every set K ⊂ S of size s (i.e.,
|K| = s), the pair (A, PK{ C) is observable.
From the analysis in [9] the following holds.
Lemma 1: qmax is equal to the maximal s for which the
system is 2s-sparse observable.
For considered systems, the following theorem provides a
bound on the maximal state estimation error caused by the
existence of noise.
Theorem 1: If q sensors have been attacked, where q ≤
qmax , then the error ∆xl0 of the state estimate obtained from
optimization problem P0,ω satisfies


†
l0
k∆x kl2 ≤ 2 ·
kOR kl2 · max kw̃R kl2
max
R⊂S,
|R|=p−2qmax

w̃R ∈ΩR

(13)
where O†R denotes the pseudoinverse of OR (i.e., O†R =
(OTR OR )−1 OTR ).
Proof: From (12) and the definition of P0,ω it follows
that k∆ẽl0 + ẽ∗ kl2 ,l0 ≤ kẽ∗ kl2 ,l0 . Since for all vectors a, b,

O†

R
where λmax
denotes the largest singular value of O†R , and
v
u
−1
u X NX
(δwk,i )2
max kw̃R kl2 = t

I(ka + bkl2 > 0) ≥ I(kakl2 > 0) − I(kbkl2 > 0),6 we have
that k∆ẽl0 + ẽ∗ kl2 ,l0 ≥ k∆ẽl0 kl2 ,l0 − kẽ∗ kl2 ,l0 . Therefore,
r1

k∆ẽl0 kl2 ,l0 ≤ 2kẽ∗ kl2 ,l0 ≤ 2qmax ,

(14)

w̃R ∈ΩR

si ∈R k=0

∗

where r1 holds because kẽ kl2 ,l0 = q and the number of
attacked sensors q is bounded by qmax .
From (6), we have that ẽ∗ = ỹ − Ox0 − w̃∗ . Similarly,
from the constraint (9) it follows that ẽl0 = ỹ−Oxl0 ,ω −w̃l0 ,
which implies
∆ẽl0 = −O∆xl0 − ∆w̃.

for ΩR defined as in Section III.7 This is significantly
lower than the required computational cost for the robustness
analysis from [15].
Finally, for almost all systems (i.e., for almost all pairs of
matrices A, C) we have that qmax = dp/2 − 1e [9], meaning
that 1 ≤ p − 2qmax ≤ 2. Thus, for almost all systems, to
obtain the bound we would need to evaluate the above term
for either p or p(p − 1)/2 sets R only.

(15)

Here, ∆w̃ = w̃l0 − w̃∗ , with w̃l0 , w̃∗ ∈ Ω.
Therefore, from (14) and (15), there exists an at most
2qmax -sparse block vector z̃ ∈ RpN – defined as z̃ = −∆ẽl0 ,
with at most 2qmax nonzero N -size blocks – such that

V. ROBUSTNESS OF P1,ω E STIMATOR TO N OISE
In this section, we provide a bound on the error of the
P1,ω estimator due to noise. We start by introducing notation
similar to the one used in the previous section:

O∆xl0 = −∆w̃ + z̃.
This implies that at least f = p − 2qmax blocks of z̃ are zero
subvectors. Let’s denote their indexes as i1 , ...if , such that
i1 < ... < if and the set of sensors corresponding to these
indexes as R (i.e., R = si1 , ..., sif ). Hence, we have that
OR ∆xl0 = −∆w̃R

(xl1 ,ω , ẽl1 ) = arg min P1,ω
l1

∆x = xl1 ,ω − x0 ,

(17)
l1

l1

∗

∆ẽ = ẽ − ẽ

(18)

Specifically, we are interested in obtaining a bound on ∆xl1 .
Theorem 2: When sensors from set K ⊂ S are attacked,
state estimation error ∆xl1 satisfies the following constraint
X
X
kOi ∆xl1 kl2 ≤
kOi ∆xl1 kl2 + 2σΩ ,
(19)

(16)

l0
l0
∗
∗
∈ ΩR .
, with w̃R
, w̃R
where ∆w̃R = w̃R
− w̃R
Set R has f = p − 2qmax elements, and since the system
is 2qmax -sparse observable (from Lemma 1), it follows that
the pair (A, PR C) is observable (and f ≥ 1). Thus, the
matrix OR is full (column) rank and we can define the
pseudoinverse matrix O†R = (OTR OR )−1 OTR , from which
it follows that

si ∈K

si ∈K{

where σΩ = maxw̃∈Ω kw̃kl2 ,l1 .
Proof: The proof, which has been omitted due to space
limitations, can be found in [20].
Remark 1: Proposition 6 from [9] states that P1,ω can
correctly
estimate the state for noiseless systems (Ω = 0)
†
†
∆xl0 = − OR ∆w̃R ⇒ k∆xl0 kl2 ≤ kOR kl2 · k∆w̃R kl2 ⇒
if and only if for all K such that |K| = q, it holds that:


l0
∗
X
X
k∆xl0 kl2 ≤
max
kO†R kl2 · kw̃R
− w̃R
kl2
R⊂S,|R|=p−2qmax
kOi xkl2 >
kOi xkl2 , ∀x ∈ Rn \ {0}. (20)
l

∗
w̃R0 ,w̃R
∈ΩR

si ∈K{

!
≤

max

R⊂S,
|R|=p−2qmax

kO†R kl2 ·

max

l
∗ ∈Ω
w̃R0 ,w̃R
R

l0
∗
kl2
kw̃R
− w̃R

Since
l

max

∗ ∈Ω
w̃R0 ,w̃R
R

l0
∗
kw̃R
− w̃R
kl2 ≤ 2 max kw̃R kl2 ,
w̃R ∈ΩR

we have that (13) is satisfied, which concludes the proof.
It is important to highlight that the bound on the right
hand side of (13) is linear in the size of noise. In addition,
Theorem 1 states that if at most qmax sensors have been
compromised, the attacker cannot exploit the noise to introduce an unbounded state estimation error. Another thing to
consider is the complexity of computing the term in (13).
To determine
the state estimation bound we need to check

p
different
subsets R of the set S, and for each R
p−2qmax
compute
O†

R
kO†R kl2 · max kw̃kl2 = λmax
· max kw̃R kl2 ,

w̃∈ΩR

6 Note

w̃R ∈ΩR

that although l0 is not convex, it satisfies the triangular inequality.

si ∈K

This implies that (19) is tight for noiseless
systems, since
P
l1
for
Ω
=
0,
(19)
takes
the
form
kO
{
i ∆x kl2 ≤
si ∈K
P
l1
this constraint when combined
si ∈K kOi ∆x kl2 ;
with (20) implies that for noiseless systems ∆xl1 = 0
meaning that the state is correctly reconstructed.
Finally, if we consider systems that can deal with up to q
attacks when there is no noise, from (19) and (20) it follows
that the feasible set for the state estimation vector ∆xl1 can
be described as the set where ∆xl1 = 0 or it satisfies
X
X
X
kOi ∆xl1 kl2 <
kOi ∆xl1 kl2 ≤
kOi ∆xl1 kl2
si ∈K

si ∈K{

si ∈K

+ 2σΩ
for all K ⊂ S, such that |K| = q.
From the relationship between l2 and l1 norms where
1
kαkl1 ≥ kαkl2 ≥ √ kαkl1 , ∀α ∈ Rn ,
(21)
n
7 On the other hand, if the noise bounds in Ω are defined as bounds on
the l2 norm of noise for each sensor at each time-step, this term would be
equal to the sum of the squared norms.

it

follows

that

√1 kOi ∆xl1 kl .
1
N

kOi ∆xl1 kl1
Therefore,

≥

kOi ∆xl1 kl2

≥

kOK{ ∆xl1 kl1
1 X
√
kOi ∆xl1 kl2 ≥ √
kOi ∆xl1 kl1 =
N
N
si ∈K{
si ∈K{
X
X
kOi ∆xl1 kl1 = kOK ∆xl1 kl1 .
kOi ∆xl1 kl2 ≤
X

si ∈K

si ∈K

The above inequalities along with Theorem 2 prove the
following corollary.
Corollary 1: When sensors from set K ⊂ S are attacked,
the state estimation error ∆xl1 satisfies
√
√
kOK{ ∆xl1 kl1 ≤ N kOK ∆xl1 kl1 + 2 N σΩ .
(22)
where σΩ = maxw̃∈Ω kw̃kl2 ,l1 .
Both conditions from Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 define
sets that contain all feasible ∆xl1 when less than or equal
to q sensors are attacked.8 However, maximization problems
over these sets may be hard to solve in the general case.
Thus, we introduce the following theorem that for a special
class of systems provides an analytic formula for k∆xl1 kl2 .
Theorem 3: Suppose that for all K ⊂ S with |K| = q it
holds
(23)
OTK{ OK{ − qN 2 OTK OK  λIn
for some λ > 0. Then if at most q nodes are compromised
the following condition holds
√
2 N σΩ
√
k∆xl1 kl2 ≤
· max (kOK{ kl2 + qN kOK kl2 )
λ
K⊂S,|K|=q
Proof: The proof, which has been omitted due to space
limitations, can be found in [20].
Although Theorem 3 provides an analytic bound for the
worst-case state estimation error obtained by P1,ω for a
certain class of systems, it could heavily overapproximate the
error due to the gains caused by the conversions between the
√
norms (i.e., factor qN ). Still, along with Theorem 2 and
Corollary 1, it provides the first analytic relation showing
that the worst-case error is linear with the size of the noise,
as in the case for the P0,ω estimator.
VI. ATTACK I DENTIFICATION IN P RESENCE OF N OISE
In addition to computing a state estimate, the presented
attack-resilient state estimation procedures also estimate attack vectors injected at time steps k = 0, 1, ..., N − 1
(i.e., vectors ẽlt , t = 0, 19 ). Therefore, in this section we
consider conditions for which the attack vectors estimates
can be used for sound identification of compromised sensors
– i.e., that no valid sensor will be identified as under attack.
An obvious candidate for identification procedure would
be to use the policy that classifies sensor si as attacked if and
only if I(ẽlit 6= 0). Note that, unless we can guarantee that
8 Note that the case where q < q sensors are attacked is also covered
1
by the scenario where |K| sensors are compromised, but q − q1 sensors are
inserting zero signals. Thus, it is enough to check the sets for |K| = q only.
9 In this section, we will use l notation (instead of l or l ) whenever
t
0
1
we describe results that hold for both P0,ω and P1,ω obtained estimates.

the set of identified attacked sensors is a subset of the actual
set of attacked sensors K, we cannot guarantee soundness of
this identification procedure.10 On the other hand, we can use
the state estimation guarantees presented in the previous two
sections to provide a sound attack identification procedure.
Consider the vector ∆ẽlt , denoting the errors of the obtained
attack vector estimations for all sensors. If ẽ∗i = 0 (i.e. sensor
si is not attacked), then ∆ẽlit = ẽlit . Hence, if there is a
t
bound on the values for ∆ẽli , we can guarantee that all
attack vector estimates ẽlit that violate the bound effectively
correspond to scenarios where sensor si is attacked.
lt
To determine this bound, referred to as Diẽ , we use that
from (15) it follows that ∆ẽlit = −Oi ∆xlt − ∆w̃i . Thus,
k∆ẽlit kl2 ≤ kOi kl2 k∆xlt kl2 + k∆w̃i kl2
≤ kOi kl2 k∆xlt kl2 + 2 max kw̃i kl2 .

(24)

w̃i ∈Ω{si }

Thus, the bounds for k∆xlt kl2 , which we will refer to as
lt
Dx , can be used to compute a bound for k∆ẽlit kl2 as
lt

lt

Diẽ = kOi kl2 Dx + 2 max kw̃i kl2 .
w̃i ∈Ω{si }

l0

For example, when P0,ω is used, the bound Diẽ on k∆ẽlit kl2
l0
is derived using Dx from Theorem 1 (i.e., Eq. (13)).
Now we can define a Pt,ω -based (t = 0, 1) attack identification scheme as:
lt

Attackedlt (si ) = I(kẽlit kl2 > Diẽ ), i = 1, ..., p.

(25)

The following theorem shows soundness of the proposed
attack identification scheme.
Theorem 4: If Attackedlt (si ) = 1 then sensor si ∈ K.
Furthermore, for all attack vectors ẽ∗ for which kẽ∗i kl2 >
lt
2Diẽ , the attack on sensor si will be correctly detected
(i.e., Attackedlt (si ) = 1).
Proof: Suppose Attackedlt (si ) = 1, implying that
lt
lt
kẽi kl2 > Diẽ . Then,
lt

lt

Diẽ < k∆ẽlit +ẽ∗i kl2 ≤ k∆ẽlit kl2 +kẽ∗i kl2 ≤ Diẽ +kẽ∗i kl2 .
Thus kẽ∗i kl2 > 0, meaning that the actual attack vector on
si is non-zero and sensor s1 ∈ K.
lt
On the other hand, let’s assume that kẽ∗i kl2 > 2Diẽ . This
implies the following:
lt

lt

2Diẽ < kẽlit −∆ẽlit kl2 ≤ kẽlit kl2 +k∆ẽlit kl2 ≤ kẽlit kl2 +Diẽ .
lt

Hence, kẽlit kl2 > Diẽ , and Attackedlt (si ) = 1.
VII. E VALUATION
Due to space limit, in this section we only discuss conservativeness of the derived l0 -based state estimation bound by
considering 100 randomly generated dynamical systems with
n = 10 states and p = 5 sensors, as it was done in [15]. More
thorough evaluation of the attack-resilient state estimation
10 To the best of our knowledge, even for a simpler problem of estimation
of sparse signals α0 from noisy measurements z obtained using an overcomplete dictionary Φ (i.e., z = Φα0 + v), the l0 -based solution [16], [21]
does not guarantee correct support recovery for α0 .

when the support of estimated attack vectors is a subset of
the set of attacked vectors.
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